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I. INTRODUCTION
"We shall never understand the natural environment until we see it as a living or-
ganism. Land can be healthy or sick, fertile or barren, rich or poor, lovingly nur-
tured or bled white. Our present attitudes and laws governing the ownership and
use of land represent an abuse of the concept of private property .... In Ameri-
ca today you can murder land for private profit. You can leave the corpse for all
to see, and nobody calls the cops." 1
Public reaction to environmental catastrophes such as Love Canal2
and the recent Exxon Valdez 3 spill has contributed to the trend of envi-
ronmental enforcement. This auspicious trend has triggered environmen-
tal progress in the legislature, the courts, and the agencies. At the fore-
front of environmental progress is the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)4 Over the past de-
cade, CERCLA has provided the means for government entities and indi-
viduals to establish liability for hazardous substance releases. Moreover,
1. JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 875 (15th ed. 1980) (quoting PAUL
BROOKS, THE: PURSUIT OF WILDERNESS, ch. 1 (1971)).
2. From 1942 to 1953 in Niagara Falls, New York, the Hooker Chemical and
Plastic Corporation dumped 43.6 million pounds of toxins into Love Canal. Metal
drums containing the toxins eventually opened, allowing rain and snow to wash the
toxins into the local community. Since 1978, 1030 families have moved out of the
Love Canal area. Michael H. Brown, A Toxic Ghost Town: Ten Years Later, Scien-
tists are Still Assessing the Damage from Love Canal, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1989,
at 23.
3. On March 12, 1989, the Exxon Valdez spilled 10.9 million gallons of crude oil
into the waters of Alaska's Prince William Sound. The spill was the nation's largest
to date and accounted for 93% of the year's lost oil. Matthew Brelis, Study Shows
1989 was an Average Year for Oil Spills, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 15, 1989, at 3.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), as amended by Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986). In November 1990, Congress reauthorized CERCLA for an additional
three years without varying the SARA amendments. Pub. L. No. 101-507, 104 Stat.
1372-73 (1990).
Congress has created the Superfund5 to cover cleanup costs where the
plaintiff cannot establish liability. Situated within CERCLA is the natural
resource damages provision,' the emerging champion of environmental
enforcement and the dread of potentially responsible parties.7
The public has yet to determine the potential of CERCLA's natural
resource damages provision. In addition, the public has not addressed
the multitude of legal, legislative, economic, and environmental questions
that CERCLA raises. For instance, how does one place a value on natu-
ral resources? Is it possible to quantify the damage the Exxon Valdez
caused to natural resources when it released eleven million gallons of
crude oil into the waters of Prince William Sound? Congress failed to
define natural resource damages, and few economists have devoted time
to the concept of valuing natural resources.8 Unfortunately, both parties
have given the courts limited guidance in interpreting natural resource
damages.' Additionally, the courts have established little precedent for
others to follow.
Traditionally, potential liability encourages positive behavior. In this
instance, the threat of liability can provide the incentive for persons not
to pollute. There is an abundance of potential natural resource damage
actions'0 to promote these incentives, yet there is a deficiency in the fil-
5. The Superfund is a congressionally enacted trust fund, mandated by CERCLA,
which reimburses the government for the cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste
disposal sites and funds the EPA's administrative and enforcement costs. 42 U.S.C. §
9631 (1988). See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. Many commonly refer to
CERCLA as the Superfund. This Comment will use the terms CERCLA and the
Superfund interchangeably.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988).
7. See infra note 44 for the definition of potentially responsible parties.
8. See Edward J. Yang, Valuing Natural Resource Damages: Economics for
CERCLA Lawyers, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10,311 (1984).
9. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 448 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (holding that limiting damages to the lesser of the cost of restoration or re-
placement was not consistent with the intent of Congress). See infra notes 98-113
and accompanying text for further discussion of the Ohio decision.
10. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) predicts that it will place 2000-
2200 sites on the Superfund National Priority List (NPL) by the end of the decade.
Other governmental agencies believe the EPA figures are underestimated. The Office
of Technology Assessment predicts 10,000 sites while the General Accounting Office
foresees the total reaching 4000. Superfund Clean-up Costs Increasing Rapidly, FIN.
TIMES LTD., Apr. 26, 1991.
The legislature has reserved the NPL to those hazardous waste sites that the
EPA determines require immediate response. Various agencies identified numerous
other sites for possible incorporation on the NPL. These sites, while not on the NPL,
are often included on state priority lists. Id. Although a listing on the NPL indicates
the environmental severity of the problem at a particular site, inclusion is not a
requirement for bringing a cause of action for natural resource damages. See New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d. 1032, 1045-47 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that the
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ing of natural resource damage claims." Simultaneously, the public, for
whom natural resources are held, bears the environmental cost of injury
to the environment." Moreover, the private sector lacks the recourse
imperative to internalize this external cost.3 The SARA" amendments
added a citizen suit provision to the response cost section of CERCLA in
an attempt to involve private plaintiffs. Likewise, Congress could pro-
vide a private citizen cause of action" for natural resource damages.
This would result in more natural resource damage claims, and conse-
quently would instill a greater incentive to refrain from polluting.'7
This Comment will address the problems inherent in CERCLA's natural
resource damages provision. The purpose is to discuss the provision's
powerful nature and to suggest ways to utilize that potential. This Com-
ment first; provides a historical overview of CERCLA. 8 Next, this Com-
inclusion on the NPL is irrelevant to a party's liability).
11. Duane Woodard & Michael R. Hope, Natural Resource Damage Litigation
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
14 HARv. ENVrL L REV. 189, 190 (1990).
12. See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L REV.
269, 271 (1989).
13. Externalizing a cost is when a person benefits from his pollution of natural re-
sources without paying for the resultant harms. Internalizing an external cost is when
the party responsible for the natural resources damage is forced to bear the costs of
the damage. Id.
14. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988).
16. This Comment will refer to a citizen suit and a private cause of action inter-
changeably. However, two types of citizen suits or private actions are discussed by
this Comment. One is where a private citizen brings an action against violators of the
law. The other is where a private citizen brings an action against the government for
failing to carry out a statutorily mandated duty. Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natu-
ral Resource Damages: Closing a Gap in Federal Environmental Law, 24 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 851, 870 (1989) [hereinafter Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages].
Both causes, of action allow citizens to recover, in the public interest, for damage to
natural resources. Id.
17. Cross, supra note 12, at 339-40. Those delegated the authority to protect
natural resources already perform broad governmental functions. These "public trust-
ees" have other commitments that prevent the requisite attention essential to natural
resource damages claims. Congress should provide a private right of action to com-
plement this governmental function and to better serve the purpose of CERCLA. Id.
See Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 214-15. Woodard and Hope argue that Con-
gress need not establish a private cause of action under CERCLA, but that providing
citizen groups with a cause of action when the public trustee does not perform his
duty would provide an adequate compliance incentive. Id.
18. See i:rfra notes 23-70 and accompanying text.
ment explains what natural resources are and discusses how to value
them."' Additionally, this Comment provides suggestions for making
CERCLA more efficient in environmental regulation. 2' Specifically, it will
focus on the potential for individuals and citizens to bring a citizen suit
for natural resource damages.2' The Comment concludes by-suggesting
that Congress amend certain provisions of CERCLA to give the courts,
regulating agencies, potentially responsible parties, and the public the
incentive to prevent ecological harm consistent with CERCLA's enact-
ment.'
II. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA
A. Legislative History of CERCLA
In 1980, at the end of the Carter administration, Congress enacted
CERCLA. The enactment helped to fill gaps left by previous environmen-
tal legislation. However, because of the hurried effort to pass the bill, the
legislative history of CERCLA is sparse.'
Legislators proposed different bills to the 96th Congress, all containing
controversial provisions.' The 96th Congress finally enacted CERCLA
from a combination of the bills.' The final version was a last-minute
compromise which "embodie[d] those features of the Senate and House
bills where there ha[d] been positive consensus" while "eliminat[ing]
those provisions which were controversial."' The effect of this compro-
mise was a complex statute lacking clarity and precision." Since then,
19. See infra notes 71-119 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 120-221 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 157-221 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
23. IA FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02, at 4A-51 (1990).
24. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 368 (1986) (citing 126 CONG. REC. 30,935
(1980) (statement of Sen. Stafford)).
25. Id. The House and Senate each considered different versions of CERCLA. The
Senate made major modifications, such as eliminating provisions establishing a private
right of action for personal injury and economic damage. The House altered its bill
to conform to the Senate bill. Id.
26. 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph). See New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 103940 (2d Cir. 1985). See generaUy 1A GRAD,
supra note 23, at § 4A.02, 4A-51 to 4A-79 (providing a detailed discussion of congres-
sional consideration given to Senate Bill 1480 and House Bills 85 and 7020).
27. Both courts and commentators have criticized CERCLA because of its ambig-
uous and complicated language stemming from a hurried effort to enact the statute
before the end of the Carter administration. Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 194.
See Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1277
(D. Del. 1987), affd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605
F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D. Colo. 1985).
[Vol. 20: 185, 1992] Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
courts and commentators have painstakingly interpreted the statute. In
1986, Congress amended CERCLA in the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA).' SARA provides some insight into the 1980
legislation, but Congress still must reassess CERCLA's effectiveness and
modify it accordingly. Congress failed to make the requisite changes in
November 1990, when it reauthorized CERCLA for an additional three
years without altering the statute.'
B. Structure of CERCLA
Despite CERCLA's complexity, it is clear the statute has two primary
purposes: to clean up contaminated sites through "removal or remedial
action," ' and to establish liability for natural resource damages.3 To
subsidize these purposes, CERCLA established the Superfund. The
Superfund, funded primarily through an excise tax, finances governmen-
tal action at hazardous waste sites requiring immediate response.'
Where the government cannot establish the liability of responsible par-
ties, the Superfund provides the financial means for cleanup.'
28. Pub. L No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
29. Kyle E. McSlarrow et al., A Decade of Superfund Litigation: CERCLA Case
Law from 1981-1991, 21 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10,367, 10,367 (1991). See
Pub. L No. 101-507, 104 Stat. 1372-73 (1990).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1988). CERCLA labels costs associated with
removal or remedial action as "response costs." See infra notes 46-70 and accompa-
nying text.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
32. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Section 9611(a) provides:
The President shall use the money in the Fund for the following purposes:
(1) payment of governmental response costs incurred pursuant to sec-
tion 9604 of this title, including costs incurred pursuant to the Inter-
vention on the High Seas Act;
(2) payment of any claim for necessary response costs incurred by any
other person as a result of carrying out the national contingency plan
established under section 1321(c) of title 33 and amended by section
9605 of this title: Provided, however, that such costs must be approved
under said plan and certified by the responsible Federal official;
(3) payment of any claim authorized by subsection (b) of this section
[providing for reimbursement to the Federal and State Governments for
damage to natural resources under their respective control] and finally
decided pursuant to section 9612 of this title, including those costs set
out in subsection 9612(c)(3) of this title [providing for recovery by
Fund of interest, costs, and attorney's fees in action against any per-
CERCLA authorizes the government and other persons to recover the
costs of response from responsible parties where liability is estab-
lished.' Response cost actions are separate and distinct from natural
resource damage claims. Response costs, CERCLA's term for cleanup
costs, include the costs incurred from both "removal"' and "remedial"
action.' Although CERCLA provides a citizen suit provision for re-
sponse costs,' it has not provided a comparable provision for natural
resource damages.'
Natural resource damages, once sheltered within CERCLA, are now
beginning to augment the role of response costs. Soon, natural resource
damage actions may be the government's best weapon to compel compli-
ance with environmental regulation.' CERCLA provides that potentially
responsible parties are liable for "damages for iWury to, destruction of,
or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release."' Section
9607 of CERCLA restricts the recovery for natural resource damages to
the federal government, state government, or Indian tribes."' CERCLA
authorizes the federal or state governments to act as trustee, to appoint a
trustee, or to assess natural resource damages."2 Either the government
or the public trustee may bring a cause of action to recover for injury to
natural resources.' Congress expanded the common law public trust
son liable to the claimant or to the Fund]; and
(4) payment of costs specified under subsection (c) of this section
[providing for research, restoration or replacement of natural resources,
prevention of releases, equipment and overhead, and administrative
costs].
The President shall not pay for any administrative costs or expenses out of
the Fund unless such costs and expenses are reasonably necessary for and
incidental to the implementation of this subchapter.
Id
34. Id. § 9607(a). Section 9607(a)(4)(A) provides liability for "all costs of removal
or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian
tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan." Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A). Section
9607(a)(4)(B) further provides liability for "any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan." Id. §
9607(a)(4)(B).
35. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
36. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
38. See infra notes 157-221 and accompanying text.
39. Frank L Amoroso & Linda R. Keenan, Natural Resource Damage Recovery Ac-
tions: A Legal Tidal Wave Looming, 17 WESTCHESTER B. J. 109, 110 (1990).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
41. Id. § 9607(f)(1).
42. Id. § 9607(f)(2).
43. Id. The trustee's finding of injury to natural resources receives the benefit of a
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doctrine by providing that trustees could recover from potentially re-
sponsible parties' on behalf of the public resources.'
III. RECOVERY UNDER CERCLA
A. Response Costs
Although this Comment does not focus on response costs, they are an
integral part of CERCLA and warrant some discussion.' Response costs
are those costs associated with the removal of hazardous waste and any
other remedial costs associated with cleaning up a hazardous sub-
stance. 7 'They are distinct from natural resource damages because re-
sponse costs encompass recovery only for the cost of cleaning up the
contamination. They do not incorporate the damage, present and future,
done to the resource itself.'
CERCLA's response cost provisions authorize the government to recov-
er for "all costs of removal or remedial action... not inconsistent with
rebuttable presumption that the assessment is accurate, provided the trustee promul-
gates the action in compliance with the National Contingency Plan under section
9651. Id. § 9607(f)(2)(C).
44. Potentially responsible parties are defined as (1) the current owner and opera-
tor of a vessel or facility where a release of a hazardous substance occurred; (2) the
past owner or operator of a vessel or facility at the time the release of a hazardous
substance occurred; (3) any person responsible for generating the hazardous sub-
stance or any person responsible for arranging the disposal at the facility or incinera-
tion vessel; and (4) any person who transported the hazardous substance to the
facility or vessel from which there is a release. Id. § 9607(a). See also Jane E. Lein
& Kevin M. Ward, Private Party Response Cost Recovery Under CERCLA, 21 Envtl.
L Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10,322, 10,323 (1991).
45. Andrew J. Simons & James M. Wicks, Natural Resources Damages Under
CERCLA: Here They Come, Ready or Not, 63 ST. JOHN'S L REV. 801, 802 (1989).
Under the public trust doctrine, the government is deemed to hold natural resources
in trust for the public. This concept originated when the Supreme Court announced
that the government held submerged lands under navigable waters in Lake Michigan
in trust for the people, and thus a legislative conveyance was incompatible with the
public trust. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892). See generally,
Rhoda L White, Comment, Natural Resource Damages: Trusting the Trustees, 27 SAN
DIEGO L REV. 407 (1990) (discussing in detail the role of the public trust in envi-
ronmental regulation).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B).
47. Id.
48. See inkfra notes 74-91 and accompanying text concerning the valuation of
natural resources damages.
the national contingency plan."' Additionally, "any other person may"
recover "any other necessary costs... consistent with the national con-
tingency plan."' The party bringing the response cost action can recover
from potentially responsible parties or from the Superfund itself."
Although CERCLA does not define response costs, it does define re-
moval and remedial actions.' Removal actions entail short-term re-
sponses "necessary to monitor, assess, and abate the immediate effects
of a contamination problem. "' Remedial actions are generally "long-
term cleanup solutions that are decided upon after'a detailed administra-
tive process."' The courts commonly label the following costs as "re-
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
50. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). See infra notes 134-156 and -accompanying text for a
discussion of the distinction between government and private plaintiff recovery.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a), (c) (1988).
52. McSlarrow et al., supra note 29, at 10,395.
53. Id. CERCLA defines removal actions as
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environ-
ment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of
release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may
be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release
of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of
such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate
damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may
otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The term includes, in ad-
dition, without being limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit
access, provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and
housing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken
under section 9604(b) [42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)] of this title, and any emergency
assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief Act and Emer-
gency Assistance Act.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988).
54. McSlarrow et al., supra note 29, at 10,395-96. CERCLA defines remedial action
as
those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addi-
tion to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release
of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial
danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment The
term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the re-
lease as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or
ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances
or contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segre-
gation of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of
leaking containers, collection of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or in-
cineration, provision of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reason-
ably required to assure that such actions protect the public health and wel-
fare and the environment. The term includes the costs of permanent reloca-
tion of residents and businesses and community facilities where the President
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sponse costs": Preliminary investigation and assessment of damages at
hazardous waste sites;' removing, storing, and disposing hazardous
waste;" alternative water supplies; 7 temporary relocation; and
attorney's fees." While past courts have allowed recovery for medical
monitoring,' the current consensus is that these costs cannot be recov-
ered under CERCLA because they are primarily personal and not related
to public health.' Courts also have determined that CERCLA does not
determines that, alone or in combination with other measures, such relocation
is more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to the transporta-
tion, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of hazardous
substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the public health or
welfare; the term includes offsite transport and offsite storage, treatment, de-
struction, or secure disposition of hazardous substances and associated con-
taminated materials.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988).
55. See Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1575
(5th Cir. 1988) (finding that investigations and evaluations fall within the definition of
removal actions); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (de-
claring that "most courts agree" that response costs include "on-site testing and in-
vestigative costs").
56. See Allied Towing Corp. v. Great E. Petroleum Corp., 642 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D.
Va. 1986).
67. See United States v. Bell Petroleum Srvs., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 771, 778 (W.D.
Tex 1990) (allowing recovery for costs associated with providing alternative water
supply); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(24).
58. See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415,
1417 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991); Adam Babich & Kent E.
Hanson, Opportunities for Environmental Enforcement and Cost Recovery by Local
Governments and Citizen Organizations, 18 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,165,
10,172 (1988) (arguing that attorney fees fall under enforcement costs). But see Kanad
S. Virk, General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc.: Are Attor-
ney Fees Recoverable in CERCLA Private Cost Recovery Actions?, 75 MINN. L. REv.
1541, 1550-51 (1991) (suggesting that awarding attorney fees is contrary to Congress'
intent). See generally Walter B. Russell M & Paul Thomas Gregory, Note, Awards of
Attorney's Fees in Environmental Litigation: Citizen Suits and the "Appropriate"
Standard, 18 GA. L REv. 307 (1984).
59. See Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (stating costs
of medical testing "to assess the effect of the release or discharge on public health
or to identify potential public health problems presented by the release" are recover-
able) (emphasis omitted); Williams v. Allied Automotive, 704 F. Supp. 782, 784 (N.D.
Ohio 1988); Lykins v. Westinghouse Elec., 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1590, 1594 (E.D.
Ky. 1988).
60. Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 904 (D. Minn. 1990). See also, Lutz
v. Chromatex, 718 F. Supp. 413, 418 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 28
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665, 1668 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 681 F.
Supp. 651, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
authorize recovery for economic injury.'
Although there is no redress for personal injuries, CERCLA authorizes
private citizens to bring actions to recover for response costs.6 The pri-
vate plaintiff does not need prior governmental approval,' but must
meet the traditional elements of standing.6 This merely requires the pri-
vate plaintiff to show that it incurred some costs in response to the re-
lease of a hazardous substance. ' In such an action, the private plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that the response costs incurred were con-
sistent with the national contingency plan.'
Recently, Congress added a citizen suit provision to CERCLA.' At
first glance it appears as if private citizens can compel the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites without incurring response costs or suffering inju-
ry. However, the government's duty to act under CERCLA is discretion-
ary; therefore, it is unlikely that individuals can compel the cleanup of
hazardous substances.' Citizens can use the section for challenging any
substandard cleanup effort that the government or any other party at-
tempts under CERCLA.' Considering the lack of action government
agencies take, disallowing plaintiffs to compel cleanup rips the teeth out
of any deterrent effect Congress intended with the citizen suit provi-
sion."
61. Lutz, 718 F. Supp. at 413, 416; Wehner, 681 F. Supp. at 651, 653.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
63. Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986).
64. See Babich & Hanson, supra note 58, at 10,169.
65. Id. (citing Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (S.D. Ohio 1984));
Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 291 (N.D.
Cal. 1984)).
66. In contrast, when a public trustee or the government brings a response cost
claim, the defendant bears the burden of proving the costs were inconsistent with the
National Contingency Plan. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a). Section 9659 provides that any person may bring an action
(1) against any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of any standard,
regulation, condition, requirement, or order which has become effective pursu-
ant to this chapter ... or
(2) against the President or any other officer of the United States . . . where
there is alleged a failure of the President or of such other officer to perform
any act or duty under this chapter... which is not discretionary with the
President or such other officer.
Id. See infra note 194 for the usual citizen suit requirements.
68. Jeffrey M. Gaba & Mary E. Kelly, The Citizen Suit Provision of CERCLA: A
Sheep in Wofs Clothing?, 43 Sw. L.J. 929, 937-40 (1990). CERCLA does not require
the cleanup of hazardous substances, nor does it prohibit their release. Rather,
CERCLA merely authorizes action, at one's discretion, when potentially responsible
parties release hazardous substances. Id. at 937.
69. Id. at 940.
70. Id. at 952.
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B. Natural Resource Damages
While environmental awareness is increasing nationwide, the govern-
ment has been deficient in filing natural resource damage claims.7' One
reason for the deficiency is that Congress did not specifically define nat-
ural resources.' CERCLA broadly defines natural resources as the fol-
lowing:
[L]and, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and
other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to,
or otherwise controlled by the United States... any State or local government,
any foreign government, any Indian tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a
trust restriction on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe."
1. Value of Natural Resources
Another deterrent to filing natural resource damage actions is the de-
tailed task of placing a value on natural resources. The traditional valua-
tion approach for natural resources was the lesser of replacement or
restoration cost, or the diminution in value. ' However, courts have de-
termined that limiting natural resource damages to the lesser of restora-
tion or replacement costs, or lost use value, is inconsistent with the in-
tent of Congress.' Thus, the chore is finding a valuation method for nat-
ural resources that satisfies the courts, the agencies, and the econo-
mists.7
6
71. Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 190.
72. Id. at 196.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1988).
74. Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 196-97.
75. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Pursuant to section 9651(c), the President delegated to the DOI the task of
"promulgat[ing] regulations for the assessment of damages for injury to, destruction
of, or loss of natural resources." 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1) (1988). This section also
provides that "damages, including both direct and indirect injury, destruction, or loss
shall take into consideration factors including, but not limited to, replacement value,
use value, and ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover." Ld. § 9651(c)(2)
(1988) (emphasis added). Section 9607 further provides that damages to natural re-
sources "shall not be limited by the sums which can be used to restore or replace
such resources." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) (1988) (emphasis added). See Amoroso &
Keenan, supra note 39 at 112-13 (discussing the promulgation of Type A and Type B
rules for assessing damages to natural resources).
76. Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 199 (noting that the term damages has
different meanings in the legal field than in the field of economics).
While restoration or replacement costs may prove sufficient in some
scenarios, there are other valuation techniques that may more accurately
reflect the true injury to the resource. One such technique determines
the diminuition in the "value" of the natural resource as the measure of
damages." Use values and existence values help to determine the.value
of the damages." These concepts offer tremendous potential to compel
compliance with environmental regulation."
a. Use values
Use values determine the value of the natural resource to those using
that resource.' Use value includes both the income from the use of the
resource and the value that users place on the resource.8' If the re-
source has a market value, calculating use values is easy. However, diffi-
culties arise in valuing a publicly owned resource with no market value.
For example, a measure of the lost use value would be the reduction in
the number of fish hatched at a privately owned hatchery after the re-
77. Barry Breen, CERCLA's Natural Resource Damage Provisions: What Do We
Know So Far? 14 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10,304, 10,307 (1984). While there
are several criticisms of using a restoration cost to value natural resource damages,
the most common is that restoration of a resource often exceeds its actual value. See
Cross, supra note 12, at 300; Yang, supra note 8, at 10,312.
78. See Cross, supra note 12, at 280-81. Cross also suggests the concept of intrin-
sic value which encompasses the idea that there is a value beyond the necessities of
humans. He proposes that use and existence values fall to consider that natural
resources have value independent of the value humans place on them. Id. at 293. It
is doubtful, however, that any economist, ecologist, or court could place a monetary
figure on such a value.
79. While this section focuses only on use and existence values, commentators
recognize the existence of other values helpful in determining natural resource dam-
ages:
User values are the benefits individuals receive from direct use of a re-
source, including consumptive uses, such as fishing and hunting, and
nonconsumptive uses, such as swimming and hiking;
Option value is derived from individuals' desire to preserve the option to use
a natural resource, even if they are not currently using it;
Bequest value is derived from the wish to preserve resources for the use of
future generations; and
Existence value is derived from the satisfaction of simply knowing that a re-
source exists, even if no use occurs.
Adam Babich & Kent E. Hanson, Municipalities and Hazardous Substances: Cleanup,
Cost Recovery and Damages Under CERCLA, 29 MUN. ATr'VY 1, 2 (1988) (quoting R.
Rowe & W. Schulze, Natural Resource Damages in the Colorado Mountains: The Case
of the Eagle Mine, Proceedings of AERE Session on Assessment of Natural Resource
Damages Under CERCLA, Allied Social Science Association's Meetings, Chicago, Ill.
(Dec. 28-30, 1987)).
80. See Yang, supra note 8, at 10,312.
81. Id.
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lease of a hazardous substance.' However, the same calculation be-
comes much more complicated when computing the use value damage to
free public access resources, such as rivers and oceans, where no re-
cords indicate the number of users or the quantity of production.'
b. Nonuse values
Certain values fall outside the use value concept because the measure-
ment of worth is not based on the resource's use but on its existence.'
These existence values, or nonuse values, are calculated by determining
the amount an individual would pay to maintain a natural resource al-
though the individual might never use it.' One can comprehend this
value by considering what the general public is willing to pay to preserve
endangered species or national parks although it might never make use
of those resources.' While nonuse values do exist, there is substantial
controversy surrounding the measurement of this value.87 To determine
how much individuals value the preservation of a natural resource, one
must incorporate the attitudes of individuals and not merely observe
their behavior.u Unlike the calculation of use values, where behavior is
82. See State Dep't of Fisheries v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 768 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)
(determining the market value of fish in a fish hatchery).
83. Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 200.
84. See Cross, supra note 12, at 285.
85. Id. Cross categorizes existence values into 3 subparts: option, vicarious, and
intertemporal values. Option value is the value of retaining the resource so that the
individual has the option of using it in the future. Id. Cf. Hope & Woodard, supra
note 11, at 200 (placing option value within the concept of use value). Vicarious
value is the amount nonusers are willing to pay to protect a resource merely because
they value its preservation. Cross, supra note 12, at 286-87. Lastly, existence value
contains intertemporal value, which is the value from knowing that offspring may be
able to use the resource. Id. at 288. See supra note 79 for other values used in
assessing natural resource damages.
86. See Cross, supra note 12, at 287-88. People are willing, for instance, to pay to
prevent destruction of Lake Erie and to preserve visibility at the Grand Canyon,
while never intending to use the natural resources or products derived therefrom. Id.
at 287 n.85 (citing Talhelm, Unrevealed Extramarket Values: Values Outside the
Normal Range of Consumer Choices, in MANAGING AIR QUALITY AND SCENIC RE-
SOURCES AT NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDERNESS AREAS 255, 275 (R. Rowe & L. Chestnut
eds., 1983)). *
87. See Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 201-02. Woodard and Hope note that
the economist can use a contingent valuation technique to determine use and nonuse
values. This technique requires a public survey to determine how much the public at
large is willing to pay for the restoration of an injured natural resource. Id.
88. See Cross, supra note 12, at 289.
determinative, individuals need not put their money where their mouths
are to determine existence values.' Individuals likely exaggerate the
true nonuse value they have for a particular resource.' The counter-
vailing concern is that many hazardous substance releases cause damage
to unpopular resources whose existence the individual marginally val-
ues."' For example, preserving a type of grass is unlikely to evoke much
concern in the eyes of the average individual, although it has great sci-
entific and ecological value.
The value of natural resources exceeds that of restoration and replace-
ment cost. Whether Congress intended the inclusion of use and nonuse
values in the calculation of damages is the topic of recent controversy.
The next section briefly discusses this controversy and the progress
made in quantifying natural resource damages.
2. Damage Assessments
The Department of the Interior (DO) has the task of "promulgat[ing]
regulations for the assessment of damages for injury to, destruction of,
or loss of natural resources .... Different regulations govern damage
assessment, depending upon the magnitude of the contamination. 9' Type
A rules proffer a simplified version of damage assessment and apply
where the hazardous release is minor.' Type B rules are pertinent in
determining damage assessment where the release is of major conse-
quence." CERCLA establishes a rebuttable presumption as to accuracy
89. I&
90. Id.
91. Id. at 291-92.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1).
93. Frank L Amoroso & Linda R. Keenan, Damage Claims; Liability for Restora-
tion is Looming, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 4, 1991, at 19, 23. [hereinafter Liability for Restora-
tion].
94. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2). See Amoroso & Keenan, supra note 39, at 112; Cross,
supra note 12, at 275.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2). See Amoroso & Keenan, supra note 39, at 112; Cross,
supra note 12, at 275. Type B regulations establish four phases in assessing damages
to natural resources. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 440
(D.C. Cir. 1989). First, the "preassessment phase" involves the trustee's determination
of whether a release affected the natural resource. Secondly, Type B regulations set
forth an assessment strategy where further action is required. This step is the "as-
sessment plan phase." The third step, the "assessment phase," involves the trustee
determining whether there was an injury in fact, quantifying the actual injury to the
natural resource, and assessing the cost of damages to the natural resource. Lastly,
the trustee, in the "post-assessment phase," prepares a report of the damage as-
sessment which demands payment of the damages from the responsible party. Id. If
the responsible party falls to pay, CERCLA authorizes the trustee to bring a cause of
action in federal court. Liability for Restoration, supra note 93, at 23.
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when a party calculates damage assessments consistent with the applica-
ble rule." In 1989, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld Type A regula-
tions as a valid way to assess damages." However, in Ohio v. United
States Department of the Interior," the same court found Type B regu-
lations inadequate." The court found the method of quantifying damages
under Type B regulations inconsistent with congressional intent."u
Congress intended the natural resource damage provision of CERCLA
to empower public trustees to recover damages exceeding those tradi-
tionally recoverable at common law.' Section 9607(f)(1) states that
"the measure of damages shall not be limited by the sums which can be
used to restore or replace such resources.""2 Likewise, section
9651(c)(2) provides that the measurement of damages "shall take into
consideration factors including, but not limited to, replacement value,
use value, and ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover." " Fur-
thermore, specific discussion during the SARA amendment proposal
suggests that Congress intended restoration costs as the minimum recov-
ery for natural resource damages under CERCIA. '
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (f)(2)(C) (1988).
97. Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
98. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
99. Id. at 459.
100. Id. at 448. See ifra notes 108-13 and accompanying text for the court's rea-
soning.
101. Breen, supra note 77, at 10,309. Traditionally, the lesser of the restoration cost,
or lost value, was the measure for damages to real property. See David A. McKay,
Note, CERCLA's Natural Resource Damage Provisions: A Comprehensive and
Inovative Approach to Protecting the Environment, 45 WASH. & LEE L REV. 1417,
1438-44 (1988) (discussing the complexity of damage assessments under CERCLA).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2).
104. See Breen, supra note 77, at 10,307; Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 203-
04. Woodard and Hope believe that the Congressional debate demonstrates the intent
of Congress to expand on common law recovery, not merely codify it. Id at 204.
Senator Baucus, a member of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works commented:
Certainly, the rules to date strongly discourage natural resource damages
claims from ever being brought and would severely reduce recoverable dam-
ages in those few cases where they were sought ....
... CERCLA ... establish[es] natural resource replacement or restoration
as the minimum measure of damage. The requirement in the DOI proposals
that "the authorized official shall select the lesser of (i) restoration or
replacemeent costs, or (ii) diminution of use values as the measure of dam-
ages" is an unreasonable construction of... the ... Superfund, with no
Despite the language in sections 9607(f)(1) and 9651(c)(2), the DOI
promulgated restrictive regulations that limited damages recoverable for
injury to natural resources to the lesser of the restoration cost or the use
value diminution."M In Ohio v. United States Department of the Interi-
or,"°M the court addressed whether this traditional measure of damages,
set forth in the DOI regulations, is consistent with congressional intent
for natural resource damage recovery."7 The court rejected the DOI reg-
ulations and found that section 9607(0(1) of CERCLA "evinces a clear
congressional intent to make restoration costs the basic measure of dam-
ages." "° The court found that in the majority of cases, the cost of resto-
ration will exceed the lost use value." Under the DOI's "lesser of" regu-
lation, recovery would be limited to the lost use value and would not
cover restoration costs. However, the court granted the DOI some defer-
ence in damage calculations. " ° It acknowledged that CERCLA does not
always require complete recovery of restoration costs."' Rather, where
restoration of the resources is not feasible or the restoration costs far
exceed the resources' societal value, exemption from paying full restora-
tion costs might be appropriate."' However, where the public trustee
formulates a reasonable economic process for assessing damages that
generates a higher amount than the restoration cost, that amount should
be recoverable."
The court of appeals decision apparently has finalized the controversy
over quantifying damages for injury to natural resources."' However,
the DOI has yet to release its modification of the rules in compliance
basis in law ....
... Trustees must have the option to use those market and nonmarket
methods of valuation that, in the trustees' judgment, most accurately evaluate
injury to natural resources and compensate the public for its losses. The
unduly narrow definition of injury under Interior Department rules threatens
present legal interpretation and might erode even common law.
Id. at 204 n.72 (quoting 132 CONG. REC. S14,930-31 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986)).
105. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d. 432, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
106. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
107. Id. at 441.
108. Id. at 448.
109. Id. at 441.
110. Id. at 443-44 n.7.
111. Id.
112. Id. See Amoroso & Keenan, supra note 39, at 114; Frederick R. Anderson,
Natural Resource Damages, Superfund, and the Courts, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
405, 446 (1989); Cross, supra note 12, at 301, 329; Breen, supra note 77, at 10,309-10;
see also, Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675-77 (1st Cir. 1980)
(holding that restoration cost of six million dollars was 'disproportionately expen-
sive").
113. Breen, supra note 77, at 10,309.
114. See Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 206.
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with the court's decision. Natural resource damages currently "include
the cost of restoration, rehabilitation, replacement or acquisition of the
equivalent to the damaged resources and the value of the lost use of that
resource in the interim until restoration and the reasonable cost of as-
sessment by the trustees.""' However, damages to natural resources
should also include future use values-not merely those in the inter-
im-and lost nonuse values."' While many scenarios could conceivably
result in outrageous damage calculations, CERCLA contains a limitation
of fifty nillion dollars for natural resource damages."' Thus, Congress
should set forth a specific definition of natural resource damages that
includes the costs and values to be used in assessing damages."8 A spe-
cific definition will enable public trustees to better understand their
cause of action and will provide the incentive to use the natural resource
damage provision of CERCLA."'
IV. PROVIDING FOR A MORE EFFICIENT CERCLA
A. Government Resources Versus Private Resources
CERCLA's natural resource damages liability section provides recovery
for damage to those resources "within the State or belonging to, man-
aged by, controlled by, or appertaining to such State and to any Indian
tribe... or belonging to a member of such tribe if such resources are
subject to a trust restriction on alienation."" ° This definition apparently
excludes private property from its definition of natural resources. 2' Ac-
115. Liability for Restoration, supra note 93, at 19.
116. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d. 432, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
The court stated that nonuse values such as "[o]ption and existence values ...
reflect utility derived by humans from a resource . . . [and] ought to be included in
a damage assessment" d. See also Woodard & Hope, supra note 11,.at 207. See gen-
era/ly Cross, supra note 12 (proposing different measures of valuation to achieve
environmental goals).
117. 42 U.S.C § 9607(c)(2). This limitation will not apply when (a) the release
resulted from the willful misconduct or willful negligence within the privity or knowl-
edge of the responsible party; (b) a violation of safety, construction, or operating
standards was the primary cause of the release; or (c) the responsible party fails or
refuses to cooperate with the public trustee regarding response activities. Id.
118. See Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 207.
119. Id. Not only will larger recovery amounts provide the trustee with the incen-
tive to initiate an action, but the threat of increased liability also discourages po-
tentially responsible parties from polluting. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying
text.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1).
121. William Hamel, Superfund's Stealth Weapon; the Coming Battle Over Natural
cordingly, courts have interpreted CERCLA as permitting recovery for
injury to natural resources on government land only."
There is some debate as to whether injury to private property involv-
ing some government nexus should qualify for natural resource damages
actions. The District of Columbia Circuit refused to accept a broad con-
struction of the statute that would have included all resources that exist
"within [a] State."" However, the court declared that a construction
excluding all privately owned property, regardless of government entan-
glement, ignores the terms "managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to,
or otherwise controlled by" the government.'24 The court remanded the
case to the DOI for clarification of the land/government nexus require-
ment, which would ultimately qualify property for natural resource dam-
ages actions."3
Despite DOI's interpretation excluding privately owned resources,
some commentators suggest that the statute's explicit language authoriz-
es a trustee to initiate an action for injury to any natural resources
"within the [state] borders," not just publicly owned resources.2 ' How-
ever, others contend that the restrictive language of the statute requires
the existence of some government involvement.'27 Excluding purely pri-
vate resources from the confines of CERCLA prevents the potential for
double recovery and maintains state causes of action."3 That is, since
owners of private resources have common law causes of action to recov-
er for damages to their property,' allowing the government to bring a
cause of action for these damages effectively eliminates any common law
Resources, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, at 34.
122. Breen, supra note 77, at 10,305-06. Breen places resources into four categories:
(1) resources that the government owns; (2) resources included within the public
trust; (3) resources that the government directly regulates to protect the environment;
and (4) resources that the government does not directly regulate, but which the gov-
ernment has constitutional authority to regulate. Id. at 10,305. According to Breen,
those resources in category four will not qualify for natural resource damages action
unless the provisions are construed to include all resources within the government's
geographic jurisdiction. Id. at 10,306.
123. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d. 432, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
124. Id. at 461.
125. Id.
126. Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 207-08. "The disparity between the specific
language of the state and DOI's interpretation is striking to say the least." Id. at 208.
See also, Note, Developments in the Law--Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REV.
1458, 1566 (1986).
127. See Cross, supra note 12, at 274 n.14.
128. Edward W. Warren & John A. Zackrison, Natural Resources Damages Provi-
sions Of CERCLA, 1 NAT. RESOURCES ENvT. 18, 20 (1985).
129. Id. Causes of actions under trespass, negligence, public and private nuisance,
and strict liability exist for injury to private natural resources. Cross, supra note 12,
at 274 n.15.
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recovery due to duplicative liability.1ln While the consensus is that natu-
ral resource damages claims require public ownership, the extent of
government involvement "will probably have to await judicial interpreta-
tion, further legislative elaboration, or at least regulatory definition.""3 '
B. Potential Plaintiffs
If natural resources are to be defended, federal and state governments
must act as "trustees" for the public's interest in bringing a cause of ac-
tion. ' CERCLA authorizes these public trustees to assess natural re-
source damages and to pursue actions providing recovery for injury to
natural resources."
130. Warren & Zackrison, supra note 128, at 20. However, instead of distinguishing
between private property and public property, CERCLA could differentiate private
damages from public damages, thereby permitting natural resource damage actions
where private property is concerned. See Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste
Litigation, supra note 126, at 1572.
131. Breen, supra note 77, at 10,306. A trustee could plausibly bring an action for
natural resource damages involving a destroyed private resource where government
acquisition of the resource through condemnation, a tax sale, or gift occurs after the
injury. Amoroso & Keenan, supra note 39, at 122.
132. Simons & Wicks, supra note 45, at 802. See also Anderson, supra note 112, at
411; Erik D. Olson, Natural Resource Damages in the Wake of the Ohio and Colora-
do Decisions: Where do we go from here?, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,551,
10,553-54 (1989). Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). While natural resources have no standing, Justice Douglas argued that
[c]onternporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium
should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue
for their own preservation .... Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in
litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime
purposes. The corporation soul-a creature of ecclesiastical law-is an ac-
ceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases ....
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuar-
ies, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the
destructive pressures of modern technology and modern life. The river, for
example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes-fish,
aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other ani-
mals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight,
its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of
life that is part of it.
Id. at 741-43.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (0(2).
1. Local Municipalities as Trustees
One controversial issue is whether local municipalities may bring a
natural resource damage action." The controversy arises in part from
section 9607(f)(1) which states that "liability shall be to the United States
Government and to any State for natural resources within the State or
belonging to... such State. " " Two district court rulings have given
"state" a broad interpretation, holding that local governments may act as
trustees and recover for injury to natural resources they control or
own.' In Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical Co.," the court rea-
soned that it would be inconsistent to include within the definition of
natural resources those resources controlled by local governments, and
yet not permit local governments to begin an action." Likewise, the
court in City of New York v. Exxon Corp."s concluded that preventing
local governments from bringing actions does not further the broad pur-
pose of CERCIA.'
Significantly, both decisions occurred prior to the 1986 SARA passage.
Congress had the latitude to amend during the Superfund reauthoriza-
tion, but left the relevant language of CERCLA intact."" Apparently,
Congress did not perceive eliminating local municipalities from bringing
natural resource damage actions as imperative.
42
While some considered the issue resolved, two post-SARA district
134. See generally Joseph J. Maraziti Jr., Local Governments: Opportunities to
Recover for Natural Resource Damages, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,036
(1987).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (f)(1).
136. City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Mayor of
Boonton v. Drew Chem. Co., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985). The preceding courts
found it persuasive that the definition of natural resources includes "such resources
belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled
by the United States ... any State or local government." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (em-
phasis added).
137. 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985).
138. I1& at 666.
139. 633 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
140. Id. at 619.
141. Simons & Wicks, supra note 45, at 808-09. The House proposed an amended
version which would have expressly excluded municipalities from the definition of
*state." However, these proposals were left out of the final enactment. Id. See H.R.
REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1986); see also Town of Bedford v. Raytheon
Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 474-75 (D. Mass. 1991) (discussing the legislative history of the
SARA amendments).
142. See Maraziti, supra note 134, at 10,038. Maraziti contends that congressional
refusal to eliminate local governments from natural resource damage trusteeships
effectually endorses the right of local governments to act as trustees. Id.
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court decisions denied local government attempts to recover for damages
to natural resources." In Werlein v. United States,'" the court held
that CERCLA permits only state recovery, and that the statute precludes
recovery by local governments.' Likewise, in Toum of Bedford v.
Raytheon,'" the court found that the plain language of CERCLA does
not encompass municipalities within the definition of "state."' 7 Rather,
section 9601(21) explicitly includes municipalities within the definition of
"person.""' While a political subdivision of a state may not initiate a
natural resource damage action, these municipalities may seek appoint-
ment as a public trustee and pursue a natural resource damage ac-
tion.
14
The state/person distinction is particularly significant to actions under
CERCLA other than those for natural resource damages." In an action
to recover response costs, CERCLA places less of a burden on "[sitates"
while placing more of a burden on "other persons." 5 ' Section
143. Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 910 (D. Minn. 1990); Bedford, 755
F. Supp. at 470.
144. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990). In Werlein, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants released chemicals, primarily trichloroethylene, thereby polluting the
plaintiffs' water supply. Id at 890. The plaintiffs sought relief under federal statutes
including CERCLA, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Clean
Water Act. The plaintiffs also proceeded under two state statutes: the Minnesota
Environmental Response and Liability Act and the Minnesota Environmental Rights
Act. Furthermore, the plaintiffs filed common law claims including nuisance, trespass,
battery, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.
145. Id, at 910.
146. 755 F. Supp. 469 (D. Mass. 1991). Bedford alleged that the defendants released
hazardous substances that tainted the town's supply of drinking water. The town
sought damages for injury to an aquifer, since it was the town's primary source of
potable water. Id. at 469.
147. Id. at 470.
148. Id. at 471. Section 9601(21) defines "person" to include individuals, corpora-
tions, associations, municipalities, commissions, and political subdivisons of states. 42
U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988).
149. Bedford, 755 F. Supp at 472. The Bedford court stated Drew Chemical and
Exxon were distinguishable because in the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act, Congress "provided express means for states to bring natural
resource damage actions by permitting the states to designate 'natural resource trust-
ees.'" Id. No longer did "state" need to include local governments in order for munic-
ipalities to bring a natural resource damage action. Id. Rather, "municipalities may
now, under appropriate circumstances, seek designation of a municipal representative
to pursue natural resource damages claims on behalf of or as a 'natural resource trust-
ee.'" Id.
150. Babich & Hanson, supra note 58, at 10,168-69.
151. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 747
9607(a)(4)(A) states that liability shall be for "all costs of removal or
remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or
an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan."",
Accordingly, a local government treated as a state need only show that it
incurred costs responding to a release or threatened release.'" In such
a case, the defendant has the burden of showing the costs were inconsis-
tent with the national contingency plan.'" However, under section
9607(a)(4)(B), liability includes "any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency
plan."" Thus, municipalities coming within the definition of "any other
person" have the greater burden to prove the response costs were "nec-
essary" and "consistent" with the national contingency plan.'"
2. Allowing for a Private Cause of Action
Legislative history indicates that Congress rejected a private right of
action for natural resource damages in the final concessions before the
enactment of CERCLA.'"' Proposed versions of CERCLA initially con-
tained a private cause of action for natural resource damages.'" Consid-
erable controversy over this issue resulted in Senators Stafford and
(8th Cir. 1985). See Bedford, 755 F. Supp. at 470.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
153. Babich & Hanson, supra note 58, at 10,169.
154. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 648 F. Supp. 255, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). See
also Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 747 (stating that "not inconsistent" is
not the same as "consistent"); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 899 (E.D.N.C.
1985).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
156. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 747. See also Virk, supra note 58 at
1551 (suggesting that Congress intended to limit the measure of recovery to private
plaintiffs).
To establish a prima facie case, a private plaintiff must prove that (1) the
defendent is classified within a category of potentially responsible parties; (2) there
was a release or threatened release of hazardous waste from a facility; (3) the re-
lease or threatened release caused the plaintiff to incur response costs; (4) the re-
sponse costs were necessary; and (5) the response costs were consistent with the
national contingency plan at the time the plaintiff incurred the costs. Artesian Water
Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1278-79, 1294 (D. Del.
1987), aqfd on other grounds, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988). See also Stevens Creek
Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990); Lutz v.
Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 417 (M.D. Pa. 1989); McSlarrow et al., supra note
29, at 10,388-89; Lein & Ward, supra note 44, at 10, 322-23. See supra note 44 for
the categories of potentially responsible parties.
157. Warren & Zackrison, supra note 128, at 20.
158. Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 212. Senate Bill 1480 and House Bill 85
allowed individuals to bring private causes of action for natural resource damages.
Id.
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Randolf eliminating the private right to make the enactment of CERCLA
ostensible."s Section 9607(0(1) reflects the absence of a private cause
of action by empowering only states and appointed trustees to initiate
actions for natural resource damages." In United States v. South-
eastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,"6 ' the court held that
no private right of action exists for natural resource damages, thereby
underscoring the absence of a private right."s
159. Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 212-13. Insurance companies, fearing
immeasurable liability, were influential in lobbying against this proposal. Senator
Cannon, chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion, argued that the proposal was not feasible due to the extensive risks. Many
senators noted that the resultant compromise enabled CERCLA to be legislated with
success. Id. See generaUly H. NEEDHAM & M. MENEFEE, SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY: TH: EVOLUTION OF SELECTED SECTIONS OF THE COMPREIIENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT (1983) (providing an illustrative evaluation
of the legislative history of CERCLA).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1). CERCLA, as originally proposed under Senate Bill 1480,
provided liability for.
(C) any injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss;
(D) any loss of use of any natural resources, without regard to the owner-
ship or management of such resources;
(E) any loss of income or profits or impairment of earning capacity resulting
from personal injury or from injury to or destruction of real or personal
property or natural resources, without regard to the ownership of such prop-
erty or resources ....
S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a)(2) (1980).
The phrase "without regard to the ownership" in sections (D) and (E) indicates a
private cause of action. Breen, supra note 77, at 10,308. The compromise, excluding sec-
tions (D) and (E) from CERCLA,.left section (C) as the controlling liability section. Id
Breen contends that what the statute does not say illustrates the fact that no private
cause of action exists for natural resource damages. Id.
However, it can also be argued that the excluded language "without regard to
ownership" references the distinction between privately owned and publicly owned
property, not necessarily the private right of action. Perhaps the elimination of sections
(D) and (E) was only an attempt to exclude purely private property from the confines
of natural resource damages. If so, it might be plausible to consider whether a private
right of action exists as to publicly owned property from step one, or from when the
trustee fails to expedite natural resource damage actions.
161. 24 Envt'l. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1860 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
162. Id. at 1865. The court determined that statutory interpretation must not ignore
certain words as insignificant. Id. (citing Bell v. United States, 754 F. 2d 490, 491 (3d
Cir. 1985)). The court found that interpreting section 9607 as containing a private
cause of action would not give full effect to section 9607(0 and, thus, would be "con-
trary to the clear language of the statute." Id. Section 9607(0 states that "liability
a. Problems with the present statutory scheme
CERCLA has not provided the environmental protection Congress
anticipated, nor have trustees used the natural resource damages provi-
sions to their fullest potential." Although CERCLA has contained the
natural resource damages provision since its 1980 enactment, no court
has ever issued a judgment for damages to natural resources." One
reason for the lack of action is that the concept of natural resource dam-
ages is relatively new. Few people recognize its significance; only now
are natural resource damages gaining understanding." A second reason
for the lack of action is that the DOI damage assessment regulations under-
value natural resources."6 Third, some criticize the public trustees for
the delay, 7 and others accuse potentially responsible parties of "foot-
dragging."" Finally, the response costs provision under section
9607(a)(4)(B), authorizing a private cause of action, is insufficient to
encourage the private sector to bring cleanup suits." In addition, this
provision alone cannot adequately discourage potential polluters from
improperly disposing of hazardous wastes.
Incorporating a private right of action into the natural resource damag-
es section would accomodate some of the above concerns.70 Without
natural resource damages, it might be more cost effective for a poten-
tially responsible party to pollute, rather than treat the product prior to
disposal. Because individuals often fail to recognize their ethical obliga-
tion to natural resources, it is necessary to provide economic incentives
shall be to the United States government and any state." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1988).
163. Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 214. See also, Anderson, supra note 112,
at 415-16; Cross, supra note 12, at 339-40.
164. Liability for Restoration, supra note 93, at 19.
165. Howard Kenison, et al., State Actions For Natural Resource Damages: Enforce-
ment of the Public Trust, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,434, 10,434-35 (1987).
166. Olson, supra note 132, at 10,552. See supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text
for the methods used in valuing natural resources.
167. Cross, supra note 12, at 339-40. Cross does not necessarily place the blame on
the trustees, but rather on CERCLA for requiring the designation of trustees who
already perform an abundance of government functions. See supra note 17.
168. Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 214. Woodard and Hope find other prob-
able reasons for the lack of natural resource damage filings and suggest several
solutions. These include (1) a specific definition of natural resource damages clarify-
ing the aptness of non-use values in damage assessments; (2) the disposal of the DOI
regulations for damage calculations; and (3) a provision allowing citizen groups to
bring a cause of action. id. at 215.
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
170. See Cross, supra note 12, at 339. Cross suggests that a private marketplace,
responsible for protecting natural resources, is a necessary supplement to imperfect gov-
ernment regulation. Id.
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to reduce pollution and encourage efficient behavior.' "Granting recov-
ery for natural resource damages creates just such an incentive for
nondamaging behavior." "
The citizen suit is the most efficient private enforcement mechanism to
encourage environmental compliance. There are two types of plausible
citizen suits that Congress should consider. (1) Private-citizen actions
against others for violations of the law, and (2) private-citizen actions
against the government for failing to carry out a statutorily mandated
duty."in While the latter ensures that public trustees execute their fi-
duciary duty, 74 the former is more pertinent in allowing private citizens
to bring an action for natural resource damages.' As "private attorneys
general," individual citizens and citizen groups can ensure the protection
of the public interest.7
171. See ALDO LEOPOLD, The Land Ethic in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 230 (1948).
172. Cross, supra note 12, at 340. This is consistent with traditional penalties under
our common law system. While restitution is an important quality in damage awards,
some argue that a cause of action exists (in any legal arena) primarily to deter poten-
tially harmful acts and to encourage societal betterment. See, e.g., id. at 340 n.383 (con-
cluding that strict liability in tort encourages private behavior); accord United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (noting that the exclusionary rule was created
for its deterrent effect on Fourth Amendment violations).
173. Citizen, Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16, at 870.
174. See Anderson, supra note 112, at 414. Anderson draws an analogy between
beneficiaries who mishandle funds and public trustees who fail to sufficiently pursue
natural resource damage actions. Id. The government holds natural resources in trust
for the public. The public trustees are appointed to act for the public interest. See
supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. It follows that if private citizens cannot
initiate actions for natural resource damages, they should be able to compel a public
trustee to do so. CERCLA's citizen suit provision, while primarily used for response
cost actions, may provide the avenue to pursue such a cause of action. Id, (citing 42
U.S.C. § 9659).
175. Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16, at 870.
176. See Olson, supra note 132, at 10,557 ("[Only with citizens looking over the
polluter's and the government's shoulders can we be assured of environmental resto-
ration."); David R. Hodas, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law Citizen
Suits for Relief From Environmental Harm, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883, 891 (1989) ("[T]he
public interes: will be best guarded if private citizens are given access to courts on
matters of public concern."). Hodas notes that other areas of law, such as securities
law, allow for a private cause of action to complement government enforcement. Id.
at 890 n.50. As evidenced from section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, he
contends that the ramifications of a private cause of action do not include an over-
load of lawsuits. Id.
b. Few problems with private citizen actions
It is evident that Congress recognized problems surrounding a private
cause of action, and thus did not intend for natural resource damages to
encompass private actions.'" However, the skepticism regarding private
citizen actions might be unfounded in light of the potential benefits these
actions offer CERCLA's overall objective."
One controversy in the congressional debates over CERCLA surround-
ed the concerns for unlimited liability upon potentially responsible par-
ties which might create uninsurable risks."7 Accordingly, if there is a
hazardous substance release, private parties are limited to common law
tort actions to redress their injuries.'" However, these tort actions
might not sufficiently redress the injuries to the resource. 8' Other op-
ponents of providing a citizen cause of action argue that the cost of liti-
gating a natural resource damage action far exceeds the finances of most
private citizens." Thus, even if CERCLA authorized citizens to initiate
natural resource damages claims, the cost might discourage even those
with the best intentions."
The government holds natural resources in trust for the public inter-
est."' A danger exists that citizen suits might allow private individuals
to institute natural resource damages actions to further their own, rather
than the public's, interests." But CERCLA safeguards against this by
limiting recovery to the government or the appointed trustee."
CERCLA further mandates that the government or trustees shall use the
amounts recovered "only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of
177. Warren & Zackrison, supra note 128, at 20.
178. See infra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
179. Woodard & Hope, supra note 11 at 212-13.
180. "Kenison et al., supra note 165, at 10,450.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 10,450-51. The potentially responsible parties are often large corporations
that can afford long and drawn out court expenses. Moreover, plaintiffs must assess
damages and litigate highly technical issues. This contributes to the immense costs of
a natural resource damages suit and suggests the impracticability of allowing for a
private cause of action. Id. But see infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text for
possible solutions.
183. Kenison et al., supra note 165, at 10,450.
184. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
185. Kenison et al., supra note 165, at 10,450-51. But see Citizen Suits for Natural
Resource Damages, supra note 16 at 870 (drawing a distinction between private citi-
zens seeking compensation for the public interest and private plaintiffs bringing
individual tort actions). See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text for a possible
solution.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
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such natural resources.""8 ' There is no guarantee that a private litigant
will use the recovery to restore or replace the damaged natural re-
source."U Moreover, because CERCLA prohibits double recovery for natu-
ral resouce damages," the statute may bar the government from bring-
ing an action, subsequent to a private litigant, unless it can prove a sepa-
rate injury. This result conflicts with CERCLA's purpose of authoriz-
ing public trustees to recover because their financial and technical sup-
port enables them to pursue a natural resource damages claim most
effectively. Unfortunately, isolating the private sector from government
activity rarely results in the efficient protection of the public interest.
c. Enhancing CERCLA with private citizen actions
Legislatures enact citizen suits primarily to give citizens enforcement
power when the government fails to act; to advocate uncompelled com-
pliance with laws; and to encourage law enforcement by the government
and the responsible agencies."9 ' CERCLA, as it stands today, does not
adequately meet these goals. Congress has empowered private citizens to
sue for response costs under CERCIA'" and has included citizen suits
in many other environmental laws.' If Congress sincerely intends
CERCLA to effectively alleviate the environmental woes of our society,
then Congress should provide a citizen suit provision for natural re-
source damages actions. '"
187. Id
188. Kenison et al., supra note 165, at 10,450-51.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
190. Kenison et al., supra note 165, at 10,450-51.
191. Babich & Hanson, supra note 58, at 10,166.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
193. Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16 at 871 (citing
Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part I, 14
Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10,407 (1984)). Breen sets forth an updated list of
federal environmental laws recognizing citizen suits. Id. This list includes the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); Water Pollution Prevention and
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1988); Noise
Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1988); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(1988); Deepwater Ports Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1988); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8
(1988); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1988);
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659; Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act,
42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1988); and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)
(1988).
194. The general requirements of citizen suits in other environmental laws will ade-
211
Although today's executive branch suggests it is environmentally
aware,' political leaders often discourage enforcement of environmen-
tal laws." This was most evident during the Reagan administration
where policies were restrictive and often hostile to environmental legisla-
tion."7
Both the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the
Interior received budget cuts that hampered environmental efforts.'"
The increase in the federal deficit and the current state of the economy
indicates that those responsible for environmental compliance will con-
tinue to receive inadequate funding."' Finally, the current enforcement
agencies often compete over litigation rights, creating tension between
those accountable for CERCLA's efficient operation.'
Allowing private citizens to bring suit would bolster government action
that at times appears stagnant."' Additionally, private-citizen natural re-
source damages claims, unlike those the government initiates, would not
depend on federal funding.' These programs, which do not increase
the federal deficit and which operate independently of federal funds, will
withstand the economic and political storm and effectively enforce
CERCLA20
quately suffice for natural resource damages. The typical requirements are:
"[alny person" can sue "any person" to enforce the "requirements" of the stat-
ute. ... Jurisdiction is usually in the federal district court for the district
where the violation occurred. Generally, before filing suit, the citizen-plaintiff
must provide 60 days notice to the defendant, the federal government, and,
under some statutes, the state government. If these government authorities
are diligently prosecuting on their own, a citizen suit is barred, though then
the citizen-plaintiff can intervene by right if the enforcement action is ongo-
ing in federal court. If the citizen-plaintiff prevails, the usual remedy available
is injunctive relief, but four statutes (FWPCA § 505, Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act § 7002, CERCLA § 310, and Emergency Planning and Com-
munity Right-to-Know Act § 326) also authorize the assessment of civil penal-
ties to be paid into the federal treasury. Once the citizen suit is over, courts
are authorized to award costs and attorneys and witness fees to any party.
Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16 at 872.
195. Liability for Restoration, supra note 93, at 22.
196. Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16 at 874.
197. Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 205.
198. Id
199. Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16, at 875. Breen
suggests that public trustees responsible for natural resource damage actions are the
most ineffective of any party responsible for environmental enforcement.
200. See Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16 at 861, 864
(discussing the undermining of CERCLA due to the EPA and DO's lack of action).
201. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
202. Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16, at 876.
203. Id. at 877.
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The deterrent effect on pollution is one of the most promising deriva-
fives of allowing private citizens to bring suit for natural resource damag-
es.' The concern of excessive liability to potentially responsible parties
and their insurers is misplaced. "With citizen suits, polluters' substan-
tive liability would not be expanded at all; only the likelihood that the
liability will be enforced is increased." ' Accordingly, successful citizen
suits will inspire potentially responsible parties to internalize the cost of
their pollution by modifying the current structure of their operation to
comply with environmental legislation.'7
Moreover, CERCLA's framework is suitable for adopting a citizen suit
provision for natural resource damages actions without repealing existing
legislation." The integration would be simple, the modification merely
procedural." Congress could import an appropriate framework from
citizen suit provisions in other federal legislation."' The general require-
ments of citizen suit provisions ensure that government efforts in
bringing natural resource damage actions are not hampered.' First, a
private citizen can only bring an action where the government is not
diligently pursuing an action."2 Second, the private citizen must provide
the government with sixty days' notice."' Thus, the government or pub-
lic trustee is allowed ample time to initiate an action if it so chooses."4
While repealing existing legislation is not a prerequisite to adopting a
citizen suit provision, the legislature would have to amend CERCLA to
204. See Cross, supra note 12, at 339-40; Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Dam-
ages, supra note 16, at 875. While Congress' purpose in enacting CERCLA's natural
resource damages provision was to establish liability for injury to natural resources,
CERCLA would best serve society if it induced individuals not to pollute in the first
place. See suprra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
205. See su;vra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
206. Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16, at 854.
207. Id. at 875. This would be consistent with CERCLA's purpose of ensuring that re-
sponsible parties pay for the injury they cause. See Cross, supra note 12, at 271 (ci-
tations omitted).
208. Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16, at 877.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 854. Breen proposes that the simplicity of adopting a citizen suit provi-
sion is of extreme importance. Compared to other environmental proposals, such as
enacting a tax on pollution, society will not be in a worse situation even if the
citizen suit provision fails. Id. at 877.
211. See supra note 194 for these general requirements.
212. Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16 at 877.
213. Id.
214. Id,
some extent. " The costs for natural resource damage assessments and
litigation far exceed the financial resources of most private citizens and
citizen groups."' Congress could amend the natural resource damage
section so that citizen-plaintiffs can recover these costs prior to the dam-
age assessment."7 If the citizen-plaintiff could establish liability, the re-
sponsible party would have to finance the damage assessment."8 The
plaintiff could later recover attorney fees and other costs of litigation."'
Additionally, Congress would have to amend section 9607(f)(1) to require
that private plaintiffs use any recovery, less the cost of damage assess-
ments and litigation, to restore or replace the damaged natural re-
source.' Congress could accomplish this objective by requiring the
plaintiff to turn the damage award over to the public trustee or the ap-
propriate government agency."2 When the private plaintiff is a more ef-
fective trustee than the appointed public trustee, Congress might want to
allow the private plaintiff to manage the restoration and replacement of
the natural resources. By requiring the private plaintiff to submit a resto-
ration and replacement plan for court approval, Congress can adequately
safeguard this alternative.
V. CONCLUSION,
The 1990s should see an abundance of environmental enforcement
claims. The number of hazardous waste sites that federal agencies identi-
fy for inclusion on the National Priority List continues to increase.' As
215. Id. at 878.
216. Id. at 879.
217. Id. See also Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 214.
218. Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16, at 879.
219. Under the American Rule, each party must pay his own attorney fees unless
there is specific statutory language providing otherwise. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wil-
derness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 267-71 (1970); see Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306
(1796) (establishing the American Rule). However, Congress could provide specific
statutory authority to recover attorney fees, thereby encouraging private plaintiffs to
initiate actions. If Congress refuses, the private plaintiff might seek recovery under
the private attorney general theory. Recently the Eighth Circuit held that private
plaintiffs may recover attorney fees under CERCLA for response cost actions. General
Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1417 (8th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991). But see T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680
F. Supp. 696 (D.N.J. 1988); Virk, supra note 58 (claiming that the Eighth Circuit's
decision ignores congressional intent and statutory language in awarding attorney fees
in a response cost action). See generally Russell & Gregory, supra note 58.
220. Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16 at 879. See also
Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 214.
221. Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, supra note 16 at 879. See also
Woodard & Hope, supra note 11, at 214.
222. Superfund Clean-up Costs Increasing Rapidly, FIN. TIMES LTD., Apr. 26, 1991,
at 4. In 1990, federal agencies found 31,904 sites that could potentially end up on the
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the public and environmental lawyers begin to understand natural re-
source damages, actions for natural resource damages should soon gain
prominence in CERCLA litigation.'m
Once understood, it is difficult to visualize a more effective cause of
action to deter pollution and restore natural resources. However, Con-
gress must make the requisite changes to CERCLA to encourage the
pursuit of natural resource damage claims. The courts have seen little
litigation in the area of natural resource damages. The complexity of the
statute and the lack of administrative interpretation or case law discour-
ages agencies and trustees from initiating actions.
Congress needs to clarify the scope of natural resource damages. A
definition of natural resources should identify the relevant values in as-
sessing damages. These values should include nonuse as well as use
values. Additionally, Congress should amend CERCLA to encompass all
property, regardless of title of ownership. This would be consistent with
explicit statutory language' and the public trust doctrine.' Lastly,
Congress should amend CERCLA to allow citizens to initiate a natural re-
source damages cause of action. This would effectively and efficiently
encourage voluntary environmental compliance as well as increase the
number of recoveries for natural resource damages.
PATRICK THOMAS MICHAEL III
NPL The NPL only included 1236 of these sites and of those only 29 had been
cleaned up. Id. Additionally, these numbers only refer to federal sites and do not
include those sites that individual states have classified as contaminated. Id. See
supra note 10 for further discussion of the NPL
223. Lawyers and public nonprofit entities should begin to focus on CERCLA's
potential to restore natural resources instead of being satisfied with recovering re-
sponse costs.
224. See vapra note 126 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 45.

